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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS

AND IMPLICATIONS OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES'
KARIM ISMAILI'

For the first seventy-two years of the 20th Century,
imprisonment rates in the United States were notable for their
general stability. During the period from 1925 to 1973, the
average number of prisoners was approximately 110-120 per
100,000, never varying by more than 30% up or down from that.'
Indeed, the lowest reported imprisonment rate of the 20th
Century was achieved in 1972 when 93 per 100,000 Americans
were serving sentences in the nation's jails and prisons.2 In raw
numbers, there were 330,000 American prisoners thirty years
ago. 3
Fast-forwarding thirty years, we find that the U.S.
imprisonment rate has grown every year since 1972. The most
recent reports published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
indicate that the number of prisoners has reached 2.23 million.4
This translates to one of every 143 U.S. residents, or to an
imprisonment rate of 726 per 100,000.' In only three decades the
United States has moved from being a nation with an
t A version of this paper was presented at the St. John's University Poverty
Conference, October 18, 2003, New York City.
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center
for Church and Society, St. John's University, New York City.
' Franklin E. Zimring, Imprisonment Rates and the New Politics of Criminal
Punishment, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 161, 161 (2001).
2 Id.
3 MARC MAUER,

THE

SENTENCING PROJECT,

COMPARATIVE

INTERNATIONAL

RATES OF INCARCERATION: AN EXAMINATION OF CAUSES AND TRENDS 1 (2003),

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/pub9036.pdf.
' U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/correct.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
' See id. (noting that "6.9 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or
on parole at year-end 2003-3.2% of all U.S. adult residents or 1 in every 32
adults").
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imprisonment rate not dramatically different 6 from other western
nations, to being the global imprisonment leader.7
This brief paper will address three questions that are
important to explore when attempting to understand the
unprecedented number of prisoners in the United States. First,
what triggered the increase in the use of imprisonment? Second,
what are the contemporary dynamics of prison growth in the
United States? And third, what are the implications of mass
imprisonment for poverty and social justice?
I.

THE TRIGGER

8

In his recent influential work on crime titled The Culture of
Control,9 socio-legal scholar David Garland argues that between
1890 and 1970 policymakers, practitioners, and criminologists
possessed a shared sense of the goals and values that should
shape the criminal justice system. This shared sense was rooted
in the belief that society had to move away from the brutality
and arbitrariness that marked the operations of the criminal
justice system prior to 1890. During this eighty-year period,
there was an expansion in the liberal legal doctrine of due
process and proportionate punishment, combined with a
corrections system committed to rehabilitation, welfare, and
policies based on sound criminological research. Institutional
objectives such as rehabilitation, individualized treatment, and
indeterminate sentences were supported by an expansion of10
probation, parole, juvenile courts, and treatment programs.
6

In order to see this pattern, one has to control for the higher rates of lethal

violent crime found in the United States. MAUER, supra note 3, at 5. Mauer reported
that even in today's climate of falling crime rates, the homicide rate remains four
times greater than nations in Western Europe. Id. He goes on to state that "[a]s the
only industrialized nation without strong gun control policies, guns clearly
contribute to the disparity in murder rates" in the United States. Id.
7 See The
International
Centre for Prison
Studies, Prison Brief,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/highest to-lowest-rates.html
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2005). The national rates of imprisonment (per 100,000 population)
are as follows: USA 726; Russia 550; South Africa 413, England and Wales 144;
Spain 141; Netherlands 123; Australia 120; Canada 116; Italy 97; Germany 96;
France 91; Sweden 81; Switzerland 81; and Japan 60. Id.
8 Portions of this section were originally published in Karim Ismaili, Explaining
the Cultural and Symbolic Resonance of Zero Tolerance in Contemporary Criminal
Justice, 6 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 255 (2003).
9 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).
'0 See id. at 27 (explaining that by 1970 it seemed that the penal system was
heading in an "increasingly correctionalist direction").
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This philosophy, which Garland calls "penal welfarism,"11 was an
outgrowth of a widely shared view that governments could be a
force for progressive change and welfare provision. In terms of
crime, this meant that "ft]he state was to be an agent of reform as
well as of repression, of care as well as control, of welfare as well
as punishment."12
During this period, expressions of
punitiveness were extremely rare and an institutionalizedbelief
that offenders could be reformed was prevalent.
This, of course, does not describe the criminal justice system
of today. How, then, did we move from a system that embraced
the objectives of reform, care, and welfare, to one that now
prioritizes repression, control, and punishment? The answer to
this question takes us to the social, political, and cultural
transformations that were underway in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Put simply, this was an extremely turbulent time in
America. Recession, stagnation, and other economic troubles
were accompanied by a series of social and cultural
transformations that were to ripple through a variety of
institutions.1 3 Changes in the structure of the family and the
household-underwritten in large part by welfare state
prosperity and economic security-were brought on by declining
fertility rates, increases in divorce, the emergence of the single
parent home, and a tolerance for alternative family forms. The
suburbanization of society and the proliferation of the electronic
mass media had significant implications for social relations,
consumer capitalism, public services, and the transparency of
government. Finally, the general democratization of social life
and culture led to increased demands for "equal rights," spurred
the growth of pluralist and identity politics, and created the
"moral individual." Less constrained by group demands and
absolutist moral codes, the moral individual placed greater value
on freedom-including the freedom to express oneself in
consumer society-and on mutual tolerance."
All of these shifts were to have important consequences for
both crime and crime control. The growing consumer culture
created more criminal opportunities.15 These, in turn, were made

12

Id. at 3.
Id. at 39.

13 See id. ch. 4.
14 See id. at 88-89.
1" See id. at 90.
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more attractive by the changes in social ecology and culture
which reduced the influence of both situational and informal
controls.1 6 Added to this mix was a large cohort of baby boomer
boys, an "at-risk" group that became the driving force behind a
steady increase in crime.17 In sum, "[t]he new social and cultural
arrangements made late-modern society a more crime-prone
society.""
The economic and social turbulence of this period generated
a backlash against both the perceived inadequacies of the welfare
state, and the "permissive," "selfish" culture that was allegedly
de-stabilizing society. Although a political movement against
Keynesian economics and moral individualism had been a
presence in the United States as early as the 1960s, 19 it was in
the 1970s and 1980s that it gained momentum. The new
suburban middle class, which increasingly saw bureaucracies
and the welfare system as huge drains on public revenues,
bolstered this more vital reactionary movement. Despite the fact
that the same group had earlier benefited from generous welfare
state provisions, this significant portion of the electorate was now
distressed by its diminishing returns. It is in this context that a
neo-liberal, free market ethos took hold of government and
society. 20 But political leaders like Thatcher, Reagan, and Bush
were not only motivated by the ideological need to fashion an
unencumbered marketplace. They also harbored deep hostility
towards a society that had, in their view, become overly
permissive, unruly, and dependent on welfare. In this marriage
of free market liberalism and neo-conservative authoritarianism,
the "New Right" was born.2 '
The emergence of crime as a normal social fact of latemodern society was to test the ability of the state to provide
adequate protection and security for all of its residents. This
challenge was particularly acute in the 1970s due to a steady and

16

17
18

See id.
See id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91.

'9 See

KATHRINE

BECKETT,

MAKING

CRIME

PAY:

LAW

AND

ORDER

IN

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997).
20

See generally Pat O'Malley,

Volatile and Contradictory Punishment, 3

THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1999) (discussing the central concerns of neoliberalism).
21 See id. at 185.
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widespread increase in the fear of crime." While some of these
fears were rational-especially for those who lived in
impoverished urban centers-television and other mass media
sources structured, reinforced, and spread this concern about
crime across society. This is significant because the media often
presented distorted images of crime, fueling fear in specific subpopulations-most notably in the elderly and the affluentwhose objective risk of victimization, especially violent
victimization, was relatively low. In this climate, liberal crime
policy came under severe attack, and its political viability was
shaken. The traditional deference granted to criminal justice
policy experts quickly eroded under a barrage of criticism from
those who argued that the faith in rehabilitation was misplaced,
and from others who believed that the system's commitment to
reform was questionable.
With fear of crime rising and penal policy undermined, the
overtly populist politics of law and order emerged to fill the
vacuum. Put forward as a "New Right" alternative to failed
liberal criminal justice policy, this approach to crime was to
emphasize expressive policies and punishments in order to reassert the state's control over crime. For conservatives who
subscribed to this position, the tough posture was the only
sensible response to a welfare state that had coddled criminals,
entrenched welfare dependency, and undermined traditional
social controls. These expressive policies proved popular not only
to conservatives; anyone fearful of crime, troubled by welfare, or
concerned about the nature of cultural change was a potential
supporter. Able to secure electoral victories throughout the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s, this social conservative
strand of the New Right left a major imprint on the operations of
the criminal justice system.
Instead of indicating need or
deprivation, crime came to be viewed as the rational choice of
offenders, and the criminal justice system was directed to impose
greater controls in order to demonstrate that it was more than
capable of handling the "crime problem."
In this type of climate, compassion and individualized
assessment eventually lose out to a managerial ethos designed to
monitor those who pose a "risk" to society. Those who pose a risk

22

See David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime

Control in ContemporarySociety, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 446 (1996).
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have come to be defined as the underclass, the marginalized, the
Zero
truly disadvantaged, the undeserving, the different.
tolerance, mandatory sentences, "three strikes and you're out,"
parole abolition, community notification orders, boot camps, the
routine use of prison, and the reduction of treatment and
educational programs for offenders are all policies that have been
proposed and implemented by this powerful movement. They
have remained-or in some cases have been extended-even
when more liberal governments have been elected. The punitive
logic is in place; to challenge it is to jeopardize future electoral
success.
The state's need to exert control over crime through
expressive measures both heightens and spreads the general
anxiety about crime. Politicians have learned that an already
anxious public is likely to support those with strong anti-crime
views. Increasingly, these views are punitive and intolerant, and
are publicized by media outlets that exploit stories about crime
and crime policy because they are profitable. The expressions of
outrage and intolerance over crime, along with its constant
presence in our culture, legitimize the public's fear and further
The result is an increasingly
reinforce the punitive logic.
intolerant society that is judgmental and exclusionary rather
than inclusive and based on tenets of social justice and social
solidarity. In this sense, prisons and prisoners come to symbolize
our fears, worries, and insecurities.
II.

THE DYNAMICS OF PRISON GROWTH, 1973 TO PRESENT

The dynamics of contemporary prison growth in the United
States are complicated and not reducible to a single cause.
University of California, Berkeley law professor Franklin
Zimring has argued that three distinct patterns of growth can be
discerned from the past thirty years. 3 The first period-between
1973 and 1985-coincided with a decline in the dominance of
"penal welfarism" in American criminal justice. This period saw
an increase in the incarceration of marginal felons, although
clear patterns by type of crime or type of offender were not
The second period-from 1985 to 1992-was
apparent. 24
characterized by a dramatic shift towards incarceration for drug23
24

See Zimring, supra note 1, at 162.
See id.
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related offenses." Mandatory sentencing and associated curbs of
judicial discretion generate lengthy prison terms for such crimes.
Whereas in 1980, 40,000 inmates were serving sentences for
drug-related offenses, that number is now 450,000.26 In the third
period-from 1993 to present-imprisonment rates continue to
grow even as crime rates decline.2 7
This period is also
characterized by lengthy sentences caused by the proliferation of
habitual-offender statutes like "Three Strikes and You're Out,"
emotional legislation like Megan's Law, and the general "Truth
in Sentencing" movement. 28 A recent study by Alfred Blumstein
and Allen Beck finds that, between 1980 and 1996, 12% of the
rise in imprisonment could be attributed to increases in crime,
while 88% of the increase was due to changes in sentencing
policy. 29 In sum, more offenders are going to prison because
there are few options but to send them to prison. Moreover,
when offenders go to prison, the sentences are very long. For
example, the average burglary sentence in the United States is
16.2 months, while in Canada the average is 5.3 months, and in
England and Wales it is 6.8 months.30
III. THE NEW POVERTY-CRIME RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between social and economic inequality and
crime has preoccupied American criminologists for close to
seventy-five years. In the late 1930s, sociologists began to
challenge the deeply entrenched view that crime was best
understood as the problem of individuals who either chose to
violate criminal laws, suffered from some sort of medical
condition that rendered them unable to control themselves, or
simply lacked a moral compass. While these have re-emerged as
the most powerful contemporary explanations for criminality,
they exist alongside a range of explanations-albeit marginalized
in the contemporary culture-that shift the focus away from the
individual to an examination of how society might itself be a
source of crime. Now, however, with the expansion of the penal
25

See id.

MAUER, supra note 3, at 7.
27 See Zimring, supra note 1, at 162.
26
21

See id.

29

MAUER, supra note 4, at 6 (citing Alfred Blumstein & Allen J.

Beck,

Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 43 (1999)).
'0 Id. at 8.
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criminologists

are

increasingly

asking whether

the

policies of the criminal justice system are counter-productive and
harmful to society. Some of the widely acknowledged social costs
of mass imprisonment include: an allocation of state spending to
imprisonment rather than to education or social policy budgets;
devastating impacts on inmates, their families, and their
neighborhoods; the transfer of the prison culture into
communities; the discrediting of law and legal authority among
the groups most affected; the hardening of social and racial
divisions; and finally, the emergence of a crime control industry
whose raw material is crime.3 '
The decline of "penal welfarism," and its replacement with a
relentless war on crime and drugs, is a national travesty that
must be challenged on moral grounds. What does it say about
32
our society when 1.5 million children have a parent in prison?
What does it say about our society when nearly one in three
black men are likely to be imprisoned in their lifetime?3 3 What
does it say about our society when 40% of those released from
prison will end up going back to jail or prison within three
years?3 4 What does it say about our society when the number of
females in prison has grown sixfold in twenty years, " and when,
by 1998, 34% of them were serving sentences for drug-related
crime?3 6 Six hundred thousand adult inmates will be released
from prison each year. This translates to sixteen hundred
inmates released from prison each day.37 What does it say about
our society when laws and policies have been implemented that
exclude former inmates from living in public housing, prohibit
them from voting, bar them from receiving welfare benefits, and
31 See David Garland, Epilogue: The New Iron Cage, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOCY
197, 198 (2001).
32 Beth E. Ritchie, The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT

139 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
33 THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION,

1974-2001, at 8 fig.4

(2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piusp0l.pdf.
34 Paul von Zielbauer, Initiatives Aim to Halt Cycle of Felons Returning to Jail,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at B3.
' Meda Chesney-Lind, Imprisoning Women. The Unintended Victims of Mass
Imprisonment, in

INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:

THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF

MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 30, at 80.
36 Id. at 88.
17 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3 (2003).
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prevent them from getting a loan to attend college?
When
viewed in conjunction with the decline of rehabilitation, why are
we surprised at high rates of recidivism? And why are we
surprised at the suggestion that the criminal justice system looks
more and more like an institution designed for the lifelong
control of the poor? A decade ago, the Norwegian criminologist
Nils Christie warned us that there are no natural limits on the
growth of the criminal justice system or on its capacity to
control.3 9 When will we heed his warning? Our only real hope
for change is if each of us asks whether the current system
represents our values. If the answer is no, then the next step is
to begin a dialogue on what an alternative system might look
like.

3 See Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction to INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra

note 30, at 5.
" See NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY 11 (1993).
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